By Stephen Dennis, For the Fairbanks News-Miner
Published Sunday, December 14, 2008
FAIRBANKS — "I have been wondering whether wolves can be killed in mentionable numbers by ground strafing with regular Army equipment and, if this can be done, whether you will consider having some of your fliers attempt it when conditions are right.”
Crazy idea? Not when J. Sidney Rood, the General Reindeer Supervisor for Alaska suggested it in January 1941 to Major Dale Gaffney, the Commanding Officer of Ladd Field (now Fort Wainwright) in Fairbanks. In his Department of the Interior post in Nome, Rood was frustrated by the dramatic decline in the Alaska reindeer population during the 1930’s and placed much of the blame for that decline on marauding wolf packs. The wolves “have killed at least 200,000 reindeer since 1934,” Rood advised Gaffney. Something had to be done and aerial strafing seemed to be an innovative approach.
According to Department of Interior reports, wolves had been reported on the reindeer ranges since reindeer were introduced to Alaska in 1892. Single wolves or a single family occasionally would be spotted but the threat was not viewed as serious.
But Alaska reindeer populations began serious decline during the 1930’s. Alarm spread slowly at first. Government reindeer managers either didn’t notice the decline or assumed it was only a temporary situation. In May of 1933 the superintendent for the Northwestern District of the Reindeer Service wired his boss indicating that the Barrow area was facing a serious invasion by wolves. He noted that over 100 “deer” had been killed. In 1934 the Kuskokwim Unit Manager requested permission to use poison to stem the growing wolf threat. Shaktoolik, Point Hope and Newhalen stations all reported heavy losses to wolves during 1934. By 1935 reindeer stations across Alaska were sounding the alarm. Plans were proposed to bring in professional hunters and trappers to stem the wolf tide and to educate the native population on herd management. But depression era belt tightening limited the resources available to fund extensive work.
While there may have been other factors at work in the decline of the reindeer population, attention focused on the wolf. Reindeer populations were declining and, so it seemed, the wolf populations were increasing. Logic suggested a connection between the two. The wolves had to go.
The reindeer decline wasn’t imagined. It was real. In 1969, Dean Olson, writing on the history of Alaska reindeer for the University of Alaska, Fairbanks noted that the reindeer population in Alaska declined from about 640,000 in 1932 to only 250,000 in 1940. Superintendent Rood had reason for concern.
Reindeer were important to Alaska in 1941. By Rood’s estimate, over 10,000 people, mostly natives, depended on reindeer for all or part of their food. In addition, cold weather clothing from reindeer hides was important to both the native population and to the US Army. The Army, in anticipation of a growing presence in the north, was contracting with natives for the manufacture of cold weather clothing for their troops. Rood estimated that over 34,000 reindeer hides would be required annually for clothing purposes.
“The Army has preferred reindeer parkas, because reindeer fawn skins are the warmest of light skins,” according to Rood.
If wolves were indeed the problem, why resort to air power to control them? Because, Rood reported, nothing else seemed to work. Poison was not an option. It posed risks for fox and other animals, valued by the natives. In any case, it was prohibited by the Territorial Law.
Trapping had been tried with little success. First, the natives didn’t have experience trapping wolves. Second, it was a difficult proposition in the best of circumstances. The “Newhouse No. 114 traps” were heavy and unsuited to sled travel prompting complaints by the natives. The wolves did not tend to follow trails in the wide open country so trap placement was problematical and drifting snow buried the traps. There were no trees to tie the traps to and the natives apparently lacked the patience to melt snow in sub zero conditions to anchor the traps.
While the Territory was offering a $20 wolf bounty few trappers were taking advantage of the program.
Hunting was a challenge any time. With the herd covering a range almost as large as the state of California, tracking was difficult. Roads were scarce for summer travel and winter hunting was limited by the absence of daylight and the wide open spaces.
Additionally Rood didn’t think “the guns of the Natives (in the .30-.30 lever action, open-sight class) [were] of the best type and condition for open-country wolf shooting.”
Hunting from the air, however, could overcome many of the problems. Large distances could be covered rapidly and different weapons could be used. Fighter planes, or pursuit planes as they were called in 1941, could tilt the balance against the wolves.
To prove the feasibility of aerial hunting Rood told Gaffney about his own wolf hunting experience during the spring of 1940. Flying from Kotzebue to Selawik at 1500 feet in a Stinson they spotted two wolves, contrasted clearly against the snowy backdrop. They proceeded to Selawik and switched to a Curtis Robin, feeling the slower “Robin” presented a superior shooting platform. They retraced their flight pattern and relocated the wolves. According to Rood, they descended from 1500 feet and slowed to about 75 miles per hour. Closing on the wolves they killed them with buckshot from a 12 gauge shotgun.“Of course, I imagine it is one thing to hunt wolves from a fairly slow ship, using buckshot, but quite a different thing to use a hot pursuit ship employing machine guns, and success with the latter equipment may not be possible,” Rood advised Gaffney.
Rood had done his homework. He believed he had demonstrated that the wolves were an issue. He had shown how they could be tracked and killed from the air. Using the Army Air Corps “hot pursuit ships” as wolf hunters seemed like a good idea. The army needed practice with ground targets and the wolves needed to be controlled.
How did the Army respond? Rood’s letter made it to the desk of the Post Adjutant, Lt Walseth. There is no record of a response.
We do know the Army Air Corp in Fairbanks at the time was ill equipped to fight anything. Set up as a cold weather test facility their fleet consisted of two early model B-17 bombers, used as test platforms, several observation aircraft and a few Curtis P-37 pursuit or fighter planes. The P-37 was a stretched out version of an older Curtis model, the P-36. To fit a new more powerful engine, the old P-36 design was stretched and the cockpit was pushed back. From the new cockpit position the pilots had a difficult time seeing well enough to land and take off, let alone hunt wolves. The planes were more of a risk to the pilots than the wolves. Only 13 of the planes were accepted by the Army before the aircraft order was cancelled. Most of the poorly designed planes made it to Alaska.
If the Army took a few shots at the wolves, they didn’t report it. It is more likely that, by the time the request made its way through “channels” Pearl Harbor had been attacked and Alaska was at war.
How about the Alaska wolf problem? Over 60 years later the debate continues. Game populations rise and fall and the wolf often gets the blame. The Alaska fish and game board continues to strive for a balance between predator and prey and the advocacy groups supporting each.
As for shooting wolves from the air; the debate continues. But don’t expect the Army or the Air Force to be called in anytime soon.
Stephen Dennis, a Seattle-based writer, has made extensive use of
personal and official records, left by the Maj. Marvin Walseth, to develop profiles and explore stories of the early flying days at Ladd Field (now Ft Wainwright.) Examples of his work are available at freelancesteve.blogspot.com.
Click Here to Link to the orginal article in the News-Miner.
